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ii ABSTRACT 
An experiment was conducted to investigate the 
appropriateness of Anderson's (1981) averaging integration model 
to self-rating. This model would enable simultaneous estimation 
of the extremity (or position) and importance (or weight) of 
those self-schemata involved in a given rating task (Markus, 
1977). It was hypothesised that the averaging model of 
integration could be described geometrically as predictive of a 
"city-block" metric, such that estimates of proximity 
(self-descriptiveness of adjective-qualifier pairs) consist of 
summed estimates of the proximities of each component of the 
stimulus item to a constant comparitor point. Geometrically, this 
model therefore predicts that movement through the space in which 
rating takes place is horizontal and vertical, but never 
diagonal. This model is contrasted with a euclidean metric in 
which ratings are predicted from the square root of the summed 
squared proximities. 
Stimulus items consisted of pairs of adjectives, each 
qualified by one of six adverbs.There were two Adjective Type 
conditions (Abstract, Concrete) and three Instructional Sets, 
yielding a 6 (qualifier of first adjective) X 6 (qualifier of 
second adjective) X 2 (adjective type) within-subject factorial 
design with Instructional Set as a between groups factor. 
Data were visual-analog ratings from 0 (not at all like me) 
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to 100 (exactly like me). These were subject to a range of model 
fitting procedures intended to 'identify convergence with the 
averaging and euclidean models, including Median Polish (Tukey, 
1975), IMSL iteration procedures, and residuals ANOVA (Anderson, 
1982). 
Results indicate that neither the averaging nor the euclidean 
models satifactorally predicted the ratings obtained, as the data 
departs significantly from each. Of the two models, however, the 
euclidean model shows superior fit to the data. 
It is suggested that the results may be consistent with a 
differential-weight averaging model (Anderson, 1982), although 
evidence to his conclusion is secondary. 
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CHAPTER ONE: SCHEMATA, SOCIAL SCHEMATA AND SELF-SCHEMATA 
1.1 "SCHEMA" AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCT 
The word "schema" has had diverse and often unsatisfactory 
usage since it entered the psychological lexicon. Bartlett 
(1932), incorporating the word into his general theory of memory, 
expressed concern about the term as being "at once too definite 
and too sketchy". In spite of this reservation, Bartlett became 
one of the first researchers to apply the word "schema" to a 
product of memory.To Bartlett (1932), a schema is: 
...an active organisation of past reactions or of past 
experiences which must always be presumed to be 
operating in any well adapted organic response. 
; a "combined standard" of stored experiences and responses which 
shape and modify any current experiences and is itself 
continually adapting and adjusting with the passage of life 
events. "Schemata", to Bartlett (1932) are in many ways the 
cognitive parallel to Broadbent's (1958) perceptual filter - both 
constructs influence the perception, storage and retrieval of 
Information, and both are defined only functionally. The 
comparability of these two constructs is illustrated in a study 
by Bargh (1982), in which dichotic listening- a favoured 
perceptual filtering task- is utilised in an investigation into 
the cognitive salience of a range of self-descriptive items. 
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Although Bartlett (1932) identified schemata strongly with 
functions of learning and memory, the concept lapsed from 
cognitive research until recently (e.g. Rogers, Kuiper and 
Kirker,1977), while a more vigorous social psychology literature 
has adopted and used the term to describe a range of related but 
conceptually quite distinct entities. DeSoto and Kuethe (1958) 
describe a set of principles as to the structure and operation of 
social relationships, which is subsequently (Kuethe, 1962, Kuethe 
and Weingartner 1963) ascribed the title 'social schemata". 
Devices used to access these sets of principles include the 
matrix of predictions about the nature of a hypothetical 
interpersonal relationship given the truth of premise 
relationships (DeSoto and Kuethe, 1958) and the placement and 
recall of the location of various "social objects" (two 
dimensional pictures of men, women, children and neutral shapes) 
in space (Kuethe 1962, Kuethe and Weingartner, 1963), this latter 
task resting heavily on the assumption that the choice of spatial 
placement reveals in some meaningful way the subjects' perception 
of the relationship between the objects placed. Noteworthy in 
early conceptualisations of "schemata" such as this is a 
readiness to describe schemata completely in functional terms, 
such that the schema is that thing which brings about the 
observed response. Kuethe and Weingartner (1963), for instance 
note that: 
In these earlier studies, male college 
students employed a very popular schema, which placed 
a man figure together with a woman figure. other 
objects were not allowed to intervene...This powerful 
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schema caused Ss to replace a man-woman display with 
the figures too close together. 
;the SCHEMA, not the subjects, placed the figures together, or 
else, the "powerful schema CAUSED" the subjects' reponses. This 
casual functionalization of the definition of "schema" has 
rendered the discussion of "schemata" almost meaningless without 
reference to the task by which the "schemata" are being assessed. 
There may be no compelling conceptual reason to assume (hat the 
same forces determine prediction of a relationship as those that 
bias our placement of human forms in space, yet the ascription of 
the word "schema" to both these constructs lends spurious 
generality to the definition and methodology. This tendency to 
produce "schemata are what schemata do" definitions in the 
absence of consistent methodology has continued throughout 
research in this area and has resulted in a wide variety of 
definitions, each with slight task-specific differences in 
emphasis. 
Zajonc (1968), reviewing this early schema literature 
describes this social psychological notion of the schema as 
comprising a set of social theories which are continually 
undergoing revision and rejection, a dynamic and unrelenting 
process of change and discovery which result in the formation of 
abstract and unconscious principles of human activity and 
relating. This view of schema both contrasts and complements more 
cognitively based definitions such as that of Bartlett (1932), in 
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which there is a tendency to regard schemata as repositories of 
life experiences which influence the processing of information by 
processes akin to filtering or selective attention. To an extent 
this division, with the cognitivists favouring a rather more 
passive, storage-based notion of the schema which contrasts with 
the information-seeking and self-promoting schemata of the 
social psychologists, remains. 
Piaget (1952,1971) casts a yet broader definitional net, 
identifying schemata with observed consistencies and abstracted 
principles of behaviour. He defines an "action schema", for 
instance, as: 
...whatever there is in action that can thus 
be transposed, generalised or differentiated from one 
situation to another. 
(1971,p6.) 
An "action schema" is thus a continuing principle of action, an 
assimilation of general action patterns which is subject to 
continuing revision and elaboration as action becomes mo2.e 
complex. A schema may be concrete or abstract, learned or 
instinctive, global or specific provided it represents a 
continuing generalisation of some aspect of human behaviour. This 
definition captures the literal meaning of "schema" as a plan or 
structure, but shares little with the cognitive and social 
psychological notion of the schema as a construct possessed by 
the individual. Piaget uses the term "schema" to describe 
behaviours, whereas it is used by others to explain the origin of 
behaviours. 
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1.2 "SELF SCHEMATA"; CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES AND 
OPERATIONALISATION 
Markus (1977) is critical of these early typifications of 
"schemata", dismissing them as: 
...vaguely defined heuristics with no real empirical 
moorings.., viewed primarily as epiphenomena, inferred 
on the basis of behaviour or invoked in various 
post-hoc explanations. 
(P.64) 
and argues for a more stringent operationalisation of the 
concept. It is to this operationalised concept of the term 
"schemata" that we owe the term "self- schemata", defined by 
Markus (1977) as: 
...cognitive generalisations about the self, derived 
from past experience, that organise and guide the 
processing of self related information contained in the 
individual's social experiences. 
(p.64) 
However, despite Markus' (1977, Markus, Smith and Moreland 
1985) continued insistence on strict operationalisation, problems 
associated with repeated functional redefiniton have continued 
through the predominantly social-cognitive self-schema research. 
Perhaps the most telling of these problems is that of 
enumeration- how many schemata can a person be expected to 
possess? 
While Markus (1977) clearly intends that one has a schema for 
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a given attribute- a schema for dependence, a schema for 
generosity, and so-on, and thus that one's personality is a 
collection of schemata Kuiper and colleagues (Kuiper and Rogers, 
1979, Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker, 1977), despite agreeing that one 
does have a schema for a single attribute, also argue that "the 
self" can be seen as "... a grand or superordinate schema" 
(Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker, 1977, p.697) - a meta-schema 
comprising both one's beliefs about onesself (the self-schemata) 
and one's beliefs about the relationships between, and relative 
importance of, those beliefs (the superordinate schema - the 
self). While conceptually plausible and experimentally 
justified, this terminology, which effectively states that 
several schemata are equal to one schema, probably complicates 
the quantification issue beyond necessity. Lord (1980), continues 
with the Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker (1977) terminology, with the 
added complication of using "schemas" as the plural and 
"schemata" as the singular. He regards the self-schema as a 
"cognitive framework" of propositions about the self, the 
framework, rather than the propositions themselves being the 
self-schema. 
Further complication has been added by a recent tendency to 
define schema neither as propositions per se nor the framework in 
which the propositions are aligned, but to speak instead of 
people as having a schema for a personality type. Strube, Berry, 
Lott, Fogelman, Steinhart, Moergen and Davison (1986), for 
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instance, investigate the differences between subjects with "Type 
A" and "Type B° self-schemata by examining differences in 
self-description, reaction time to descriptors, and recall of 
words related to "type A" and "type B" personalities. Besides 
revealing the extent to which schema theory and trait theory have 
come to parallel each other, this terminology adds another 
possibility to the quantification of schemata. Subjects in this 
study are not defined as having a cluster of schemata that 
combine in such a way as to produce "type A" characteristics, but 
simply as having "a type A schema"- a single self- description to 
the effect that one is of Type A. This enlarges upon even the 
Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker (1977) terminology, since it 
presupposes that schemata, like traits, come in natural types or 
clusters of some description. The difficulty that is arising is 
that it would now seem impossible to state what aspects of human 
behaviour are or are not the products of particular types of 
"self-schemata", not on the basis of empirical certainty, but on 
that of conceptual and terminological imprecision. Currently one 
could correctly call a single proposition about onesself a 
"schema" (after Markus, 1977), one's entire sense of personhood a 
"schema" (after Rogers Kuiper and Kirker, 1977) , and the general 
categorisation of what sort of person one is a "schema" (after 
Strube et. al. 1986). 
The only feasible solution to such imprecision is to generate 
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and adopt a single, meaningful operational definition of 
"schemata", one which retains certain key qualities from the 
foregoing literature, but which makes continuing experimental 
research possible and comparable. Markus (1977) has argued that 
her method of classification of "schematics" and "aschematics" 
for a given behavioural domain provides such a definition. 
However, as shall be discussed below, these methods of 
classification and distinction of subgroups is itself 
conceptually imprecise. 
Markus (1977) regards self-schemata as a set of firmly held , 
presumably verbal propositions about the self, derived from the 
full range of social and non-social experience: 
Self schemata include cognitive representations 
derived from specific events and situations involving 
the individual.., as well as more general 
representations derived from repeated categorization 
and subsequent evaluation of the person's behaviour by 
himself and by others around him. (e.g. "I am very 
talkative in groups of three or four, but shy in large 
gatherings, "I am generous", "I am creative", "I am 
independent". 
(p.64) 
These 'cognitive generalisations" are often typified by Markus 
as a list of self-descriptions in which the individual is placed 
at a single point along a stated bipolar dimension, with the 
degree of "schematicity" , indeed the existence of the schema at 
all on that dimension being determined by a combination of the 
extremity of this position and the importance of that dimension 
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as a whole in the person's self-concept. It becomes possible, 
therefore, to allocate people to groups on the basis of the 
polarity and importance of their schemata in various domains, and 
this provides the basis for Markus' (1977) operational definition 
of "Schematics" and "Aschematics" for a given behavioural domain. 
Her criteria for membership of each group are first stated in 
her 1977 classification of Dependents, Independents, and 
Aschematics. 
For the purposes of classification in the domain of 
Dependence-Independence, Markus (1977) asked subjects to rate 
themselves on various trait adjectives relevant to this 
dimension, to endorse items on the adjective checklist and to 
rate on an 11-point scale the importance of the rated traits in 
their attitudes about themselves. Three groups are defined on the 
basis of these tasks. "Independents" were: 
"those subjects who rated themselves at the extreme 
end (points 8-11 on an 11 point scale) on at least two 
of the following semantic differential scales: 
Independent-Dependent, Individualist-Conformist, or 
Leader-Follower, and who rated these dimensions as 
"important" (points 8-11 on an 11 point scale), and who 
checked themselves as "independent" on the Adjective 
Checklist". 
"Dependents" were those who rated themselves at the other 
extreme (points 1-4) on at least two of the three dimensions 
described above, who ascribed 8-11 points of importance to these 
dimensions, and who endorsed "dependent" in the adjective 
checklist. Finally, a group of subjects termed "Aschematics" 
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rated themselves in the middle (4-7) range on two of the three 
above dimensions, did not endorse either "dependent" nor 
"independent" in the checklist task, and "fell in the lower 
portion of the importance scale". 
Specific criticisms can be lodged at aspects of these 
operational criteria, which Markus has preserved in form 
throughout her schema research. There is a ring of undue 
arbitrariness to the two out of three and 8 to 11 criteria. There 
is also a methodological fuzziness surrounding the importance 
ratings required in order for a subject to be deemed 
"aschematic", with no criteria stated beyond that those so 
categorised had scores which "fell in the lower portion" of the 
scale. Further, it becomes possible for a person to be 
categorised as highly schematic for, say "dependent", while 
having rated themselves as "independent " on the sematic 
differential scale, since the other criteria could be ITet without 
this rating. Arbitrariness is, however,in many ways a price of 
operationalisation, and the validity of such criteria are only to 
be borne out in their explanatory and experimental usefulness. A 
more important concern is with the categorization of the 
"aschematic" group, described by Markus as "without schema on 
this dimension" (p.66), since this group is clearly intended to 
contain only those who have no "cognitive generalisation about 
the self" in the domain of dependence and independence. This 
therefore is a category of conceptual as well as of definitional 
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concern, as the success of the inclusion criteria hinges upon the 
confidence that those who ought to have been excluded have been. 
The role of the "importance criterion" in ascribing membership to 
this group is crucial to understanding the Markus (1977) 
conceptualisation of schemata. 
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1.3 THE ROLE OF DIMENSION IMPORTANCE IN DETERMINING SCHEMATICITY 
Markus' (1977) "importance criterion"- that subjects will 
only be termed schematic for a domain if that domain is important 
to their self-concept- is included to accommodate the possibility 
that a subject could be highly schematic for a position midway 
along the bipolar scale. The imposition of the criterion implies 
that nobody who rates the dimension as highly important can be 
categorised as "aschematic". Conversely, however, the criterion 
makes manifest an assumption by Markus that schemata are 
necessarily important in one's self-evaluation. Markus, Smith and 
Moreland (1985) make a methodological improvement to the use of 
the importance criterion by specifying more precisely a criterial 
level of "unimportance" at which a subject will be deemed 
"aschematic". The domain being investigated in this study is 
masculinity, and the criterion tasks are parallel to those of 
Markus (1977)- semantic differential rating, adjective 
endorsement and importance ratings. The significant 
methodological difference between this and the earlier study is 
that an "unimportance criterion" is set for membership of the 
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aschematic group- to be termed "aschematic" subjects had to rate 
two of the three dimensions related to masculinity between points 
8 and 11 (11 in this case representing 11 "not at all important" 
and 1 " most important"). While it is more methodologically 
complete, this innovation serves to emphasise, rather than to 
resolve the problem of the importance criterion in determining a 
person "aschematic". If, as Markus (1977) claims, a schema is a 
learned generalisation about the self, and the "self-schema" is 
the set of such generalisations, then these generalisations could 
reasonably be expected to be distributed along the dimension of 
importance, with some schemata being very important indeed and 
some being almost completely unimportant- they are no less 
cognitive generalisations about the self by virtue of not being 
particularly prominent in self-evaluation. If a schema is defined 
as a learned self-description then importance, as well as 
extremity, is more sensibly seen as a feature of the schema under 
Investigation, rather than as a criterion for determining whether 
the schema is present or absent. 
Empirically, both extremity (or position) and importance 
(or weight) are central to a person's schema in a given domain. 
Markus, Smith and Moreland (1985) report that the correlations 
between these variables have ranged across studies between 0.78 
and 0.89, indicating that this relationship is strong and 
positive. While this would be a predictable finding- that those 
who occupy more extreme positions on dimensions also value those 
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dimensions more highly in their self-description- it is also an 
important one, and not one to be subsumed as a consequence of the 
definition of "schema". An adequate understanding of schemata 
therefore demands simultaneous estimation both of where a person 
is placed on a descriptive dimension and of how prominantly that 1 
dimension features in self-description, as well investigation 
into the extent of covariance between these two variables. It 
shall be argued that the adding and averaging models described by 
Anderson (1965, 1981, 1983) provide potentially useful algebraic 
and geometric descriptions of subjects' performances on 
self-rating tasks. The present study investigates the 
applicability of Anderson's averaging model and an alternative 
Euclidean model to the assessment of position and weight of rated 
dimensions in a simple rating task. 
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CHAPTER TWO: SELF-SCHEMATA, FUNCTIONAL ALGEBRA AND COGNITIVE 
GEOMETRY 
2.1 SELF-SCHEMATA AS PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS 
Nelson and Hayes (1981) usefully describe personality as " a 
cluster of points in N-dimensional space", a description that is 
applicable to both trait and schema typifications of 
"personality" . That part of the individual that is consistent 
across time and space can be viewed, at least by analogy, as a 
network of habitual or otherwise enduring positions on a series 
of behavioural, attitudinal or self-descriptive dimensions. The 
"uniqueness" of the individual, on this interpretation, is a 
manifestation of the uniqueness of the complement of the set of 
dimensions, the cluster of points so defined, and the relative 
prominence of various dimensions in the individual's behaviour or 
self-description. 
This understanding of "personality" is applicable to the 
interpretation of schema theory, and while by no means capturing 
the subtlety of the theory, particularly as regards the 
information processing roles of self-schemata, it enables certain 
implications of schema research to be investigated using 
geometric and algebraic models of information processing. From 
Markus (1977), for instance, it can be understood that a person 
Si 
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having a schema for "dependence-independence" can be described as 
i. Having within her cognitions about herself a conceptual 
dimension reaching from the most dependent possible person to the 
most independent possible person, ii. Habitually occupying or 
endorsing a position some specifiable distance along this 
dimension, and iii ascribing a quantifiable level of importance 
to this dimension in her description of herself. This view -that 
self-schemata can sensibly be seen as a set of propositions 
endorsing points upon a range of conceptual dimensions- has lead 
many writers to describe schemata in terms parallel to those used 
in descriptions of traits, the key difference being that schemata 
are always products of learning and thus subject to change. 
Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker (1977) draw this parallel: 
More than likely a portion of the list... [of terms 
describing "the self"] ... consist of general terms-
not unlike traits- that represent the abstracted 
essentials of an individual's view of self 
(p.677-8) 
2.2 THE GEOMETRY OF INTEGRATION 
If schemata can indeed be conceptualised as points upon 
variously weighted conceptual dimensions, then their product- the 
behaviours or attitudes held by the individual- represent some 
form of nett output of this cluster of points, with the nature, 
polarity and importance of the output corresponding in some way 
to the existence, extremity and weighting of the dimensions 
relevant to the task. For a self-rating task, then , a person's 
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response to a single stimulus item demanding combination of more 
than one dimension may be taken as a manifestation of the 
relative extremity and weighting of those schemata called upon. 
If this were the case, it ought be possible to Identify the 
procedure by which the schemata are combined by modelling 
produced response in terms of mathematical or geometric 
princAples. The simplest possible such model would state that the 
output is a weighted sum of the positions of the schemata called 
upon, an instance of Anderson's (1965, 1981, 1983) general 
principle of additive or averaging information integration. 
This adding or averaging model can be depicted geometrically 
as a "city-block" metric, that is, it predicts that subjects 
"move" from the object being rated to some hypothetical fixed 
comparitor point horizontally and vertically along the dimensions 
involved in the rating, with the distances so moved being added 
to produce the observed response. Consider, for instance 
Anderson's (1981) meal rating task,in which subjects are asked to 
rate how much they imagine they would like certain given 
combinations of vegetable and main course. The stimuli to be 
integrated are main courses and vegetables, and the single output 
an overall rating of likeability. Presumably an early stage of 
processing involved in performing this task is ascribing a 
likeability value to each stimulus given. Anderson (1981) refers 
to this process as the operation of the "Valuation function" 
0 
(p5). Valuation involves the ascription of a value to the 
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component stimuli (how likeable are sausages as a main course) 
and of a weight to the stimulus dimension as a whole (hdiq much 
does the choice of main course influence my enjoyment of any 
meal?). Once Valuation has taken place, the "Integration 
function" combines the stimuli and gives rise to a "Response 
Function" which produces the measurable output. 
For Valuation to occur in accord with the predictions of 
additivity, the scale value of all stimuli along a single 
dimension (the likeability of each main course) must be indexed 
conceptually to a single point. That is to say, additivity could 
not be observed if subjects were using entirely different notions 
of "likeablity" for sausages from that which they are using for 
roast lamb. It must be assumed that in a single stimulus domain, 
subjects are making all ratings relative to some enduring 
standard. This stage of valuation- the ascription of scale values 
to stimuli can be conceptualised as the linear distance between 
the given stimulus and the standard, with the rated scale value 
of the given equalling Its distance from (or proximity to) the 
standard. Thus the valuation function by which the given stimuli 
are provided with values along the response dimension can be 
described as depicted in Equation 1 : 
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SAIL = 'GA/ - cal 
[EQUATION 1) 
,where Smi is the scale value of the ieh level of stimulus 
factor A. 
CA is the standard, or comparitor point on dimension A 
and Gmi is the given stimulus item. 
The second process of Valuation, the weighting of the 
stimulus dimension as a whole, influences the magnitude of the 
effect of each stimulus in the overall integration, and can thus 
be described as a multiplying function. Geometrically, this 
multiplication serves to alter the absolute size of the stimulus 
dimension without effecting the relative placement of either the 
scale values or the comparitor point along it. An assumption made 
for the purposes of early analysis is that the weighting of a 
stimulus dimension is constant along the length of that 
dimension, and that therefore the weight of each dimension is a 
multiplicative constant, stretching or shortening the stimulus 
dimension by an amount that is constant along the length of the 
dimension. 
The Valuation function for a simple two-dimension paradigm 
can thus be depicted graphically, with a point (GA,,, G ni ) 
representing the given stimuli on dimensions A and B, and the 
point (Cm , CB ) as the location of the comparitor points on 
dimensions A and B respectively: 
0 
Dimension A (xWA) 
(CA) 	 *(CA,C8) 
(rGAi-c4 	C 
(GAi) 	 (GAI, G5j) *
(IGBj-051) 
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(GBj) 	(CB) 
Dimension B (XWB) 
FIGURE 2.1 REPRESENTATION OF THE GIVEN STIMULUS VALUES AND 
COMPARITOR VALUES FOR DIMENSIONS A AND B AS POINTS IN 
TWO-DIMENSIONAL SPACE. 
The Integration function of an adding-type model assumes that 
the response is a weighted sum of the scale values, thus that 
ri j = WA1 	4GAI - c4) + W„,(JGBJ  - c,,I) 
[Equation 2]. 
,where ri, is the response to the stimulus comprising 
the i th level of factor A and the jth level of factor B, 
WAI is the weight of stimulus dimension A at level i, 
and %DJ is the weight of dimension B at level j. 
20 
An additive integration and valuation model thus predicts 
that a subject's rated response to a two-dimension complex 
stimulus in which weighting is assumed constant is equal to the 
sum of the distances along the horizontal and vertical axes 
between the given value on dimension A and a standard comparison 
point on that dimension, and the given value on dimension B and a 
comparitor on that dimension, with each distance multiplied by 
the weight of the respective dimensions. It is thus appropriate 
to describe this straightforward additive model as predictive of 
a "city block" metric, in which "travel" from one point in space 
to another occurs horizontally and vertically but never 
diagonally. A subject's response is the weighted sum of the 
distances thus travelled. 
Simple additive models of information integration have been 
suggested for some time. Guilford (1931) investigated the extent 
to which subjects' reports of the pleasantness of colours 
corresponded to a weighted sum of the pleasantness of the 
component colours, and found that, while the additive model was 
explanatory, the integration process seemed more to parallel a 
process of stimulus averaging. Spence and Guilford (1932) 
similarly found that the rated pleasantness of odors is a 
weighted mean of the more pleasant and the less pleasant odor. 
The weighting of the two odors seemed determined largely by the 
extent to which one odor prevailed over the other: 
When one odor of the pair is dominant, it carries 
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much more weight in determining the affective value of 
the combination than does the recessive odor. The 
affective weight of the dominant odor probably depends 
upon the degree of dominance. 
(p501) 
Both Guilford (1931) and Spence and Guilford (1932) were 
unsuccessful in attempting to predict pleasantness ratings of the 
compound from a simple sum of the components, both found it 
necessary to regard the mechanism of integration as an average or 
weighted mean of the pleasantnets of the components. Anderson 
(1981) has also found that a weighted averaging model proves more 
Successful in any direct testing between the two: 
Adding and other linear models have been widely 
considered in psychology and have dominated research in 
some areas of decision theory and other fields. The 
intuitive plausibility and mathematical simplicity of 
these models have been major reasons of their 
popularity. When appropriate experimental test g have 
been made, however, the linear models have seldom 
succeeded. Simple critical tests have regularly ruled 
out linear models in many of the areas in which they 
have been most popular. 
Many of these tests have also supported the 
operation of an alternative averaging model. 
(1981, p59) 
Forms of the averaging type integration model have been 
demonstrably effective in predicting responses for a large range 
of integration tasks. Beginning with Anderson (1962), whb first 
observed averaging-type principles at work in person judgement, a 
large and diverse research system has developed around 
integration theory. Additive and averaging rules have been found 
to be explanatory of an enormous range of human judgements, 
including psychophysical estimation (Anderson, 1970), quantity 
judgements (Anderson and Cuneo, 1978), moral culpability (Leon, 
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1980, cited in Anderson, 1981), judgements of complex social 
stimuli (e.g. Manis, Gleason and Dawes, 1986), even judgements of 
preference for hypothetical contraceptive methods (Jaccard and 
Becker, 1985). Further studies (e.g Birnbaum, 1974) have found 
that even when additivity is apparently not present in raw rating 
data, what departures there are can frequently be attributed to 
nonlinearity of the rating scale used, and an adding or 
averaging-type model can be reclaimed through monotonic rescaling 
of the response medium. There is thus strong evidence to indicate 
that averaging type models, and occasionally multiplicative 
models, represent general principles of judgement formation, 
generalisable across all domains of judgement formulation. The 
application of this type of model to the rating of 
self-descriptive propositions, and investigation of its wider 
implications for schema theory therefore warrants experimental 
attention. 
There are few substantial differences between an averaging 
and an adding model of information integration. Both predict 
parallelism (Anderson, 1981), that is, both models predict that a 
factorial plot of obtained data will consist of parallel() lines. 
Indeed, both make the same predictions about the observable data 
from most rating experimentation. The essential difference 
between the models is that the averaging model divides the 
overall weighted sum by a constant representing the summed 
weights of the values. This reduces the absolute magnitude of the 
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response range while preserving both the relative values of. 
points along the dimensions and the weight of each dimension. The 
averaging model retains the multiplication of weight by value and 
the addition of products, as represented in Equation 2, with the 
sum then divided by the summed weights of the stimuli. Anderson 
(1981) includes the Initial State, S., in his mathematical 
representation of this model. S. represents the prior beliefs or 
dispositions of the individual before entering the experimental 
situation, and can be likened to a representation of the origin 
of the scale, that is, the a priori tendency of the individual to 
respond at a certain position on any linear scale. 
Mathematically, then, the averaging model an be written as: 
ri i =(W. Sep 4 WAiq GAI - CAI) 4' WD,((G19.1 	Cal ) / ( Wa +WAi + W193 ) 
(equation 33 
,where W. is the weight of the Initial state, 
S. is the scale value of the Initial State, 
WAI, GAI and CA are the weight, the given value and the 
comparitor value for stimulus dimension A, and 
Wpi, Gej and CD are the weight, the given value and the 
comparitor values for stimulus dimension B. 
For present purposes, this general form of the averaging 
equation can be simplified. In the experiment to be described, 
subjects are asked to rate on a visual-analog scale how true they 
believe certain two-component propositions are of them. Each 
propositibmconsists of two adjectives each qualified by one of 
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five qualifiers (minimally, slightly, rather, reasonably, 
extremely) or left unqualified ,with the adjective-qualifier 
pairs combined by the word "and". The propositions to be rated 
are therefore of the form "Rather Dependent and "Extremely Calm", 
with the ratings ranging from "not at all like me" to "exactly 
like me". Pilot and other research (Cliff, 1959, Anderson and 
Lopes, 1974) has indicated that qualifiers function as 
multipliers, their combination with adjectives producing the 
"linear fan pattern" (Anderson, 1981) typical of multiplicative 
• constants (See Appendix 1). A qualifier combined with an 
adjective, therefore, produces a single cognitive unit which can 
range from zero to infinity for that dimension. For "calm", for 
instance, the application of a qualifier to "calm" multiplies the 
unqualified word by a constant amount, producing a single 
compound that is located somwhere between "zero calm" and 
"infinity calm". Whether the "zero calm" point represents to the 
subject a notion of high anxiety,that is, the dimension is seen 
as bipolar, or merely a notion of "not calm", that is, the 
dimension is unipolar, is immaterial for the purposes of the 
present study, as the geometry involved , including the concept 
of the rating as an estimate of proximity of two points would not 
be affected by this cognitive, within subject variable. 
The use of a range of qualifiers could therefore be expected 
to create a series of points along the single dimension described 
by the adjective, as a pilot study has demonstrated. As stated 
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earlier, in preliminary model fitting the integration rule is to 
be regarded as one of equal weighting, in that it shall be 
assumed that the predominance of the two dimensions in 
self-description remains constant across all levels of each 
dimension. In this equal weight case, the weight of each instance 
of a stimulus dimension is equal to the weight of every other 
instance; WA., therefore equalling WA and Wp j equalling Ws , with 
W. remaining a constant. As Anderson (1981) explains, the 
denominator of Equation 2 therefore itself becomes a constant for 
every pair of stimuli and the response a linear function of the 
two weights and scale values. The averaging model in this case 
closely resembles the weighted adding model described in Equation 
2. Since the constant denominator effects only the absolute, not 
the relative magnitude of the ratings produced in a task where 
all responses are assumed to range between 0 and 1, it can be 
safely regarded as algebraically irrelevant. 
The final simplifying assumption concerns the relativity of 
weights of the stimuli. It is assumed for present purposes that 
WA and Wig SUM to 1. This assumption can be made if one 
understands the response as being completely determined by the 
stimulus items, and thus the weighting being completely 
distributed between the stimuli. This assumption overlooks W., 
the weighting of the initial state or origin. However, as stated 
previously, the scaling of the response scale in the present task 
distributes all responses between 0 and 1, and therefore the 
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constant effects of S. and W. can be assumed equal to zero. The 
assumption of relative weighting is described by Anderson 
(1981): 
However, the relative weight of any stimulus depends 
on the other stimuli in the set. In each set, the 
denominator term forces the relative weights to sum to 
1, the condition for an average. 
(p64) 
The averaging equation to be used initially in the present 
experiment, in the light of these two assumptions, can thus be 
written as follows: 
rtj = WA 4GAi - C op+ ((I - Cal)) 
[equation 4] . 
where WA and We are the constant weights of factors A and B 
respectively across all stimulus levels, and all other 
terms are as previously defined 
This model is very similar to that depicted in Equation 2, 
the only important difference being that this averaging model 
constrains WA and We to SUM to 1. The mathematical rationale for 
this has already been discussed. Geometrically, however, this 
constraint implies that the greatest possible valuation of a 
stimulus unit is equal to the length of the dimension multiplied 
by 1.0, and thus the largest possible response is equal to the 
dimension length, a situation which will only occur when the 
weight of the other dimension in the compound it is equal to 0. 
As responses in the present task themselves range between 0 and 
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1, the averaging model will not permit a rated response that is 
greater than the unit. If weight is regarded as an index of 
dimension magnitude, the longest a dimension can be is one unit, 
and then only if the other dimension has no length. 
The geometric prediction of the averaging model to be used in 
the present task can therefore be represented as follows: 
(GBP 	(CB) 
Dimension B (XWB) 
Dimension A (XWA) 
rij WA OGAi-C4 + (1-WA413Bj-CE1) 
(CA) 
	
*(CA,Cf” 
(I GAi-C4 
(GAi) 	 (GA1, GBP * 	 
(IG13.1-051) 
FIGURE 2.2: GEOMETRIC REPRESENTATION OF THE AVERAGING 
INTEGRATION MODEL . 
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The "comparitor" in this case is the point at which the 
subject would freely place herself upon this dimension, the 
"given", in this example, represents the point "Rather Dependent 
and Extremely Calm. The subject's placement and order of the 
qualifiers , the comparitor point on each dimension, and the 
weight value of the first dimension, would all, of course, be 
within subject variables, and would, if the model is found to fit 
the data obtained, be estimable by simple calculation from all 
proximity estimates for all given points. As with the additive 
model, the averaging model predicts "parallelism" (Anderson, 
1965), in that it predicts that the change produced in moving 
from one stimulus level to another on one stimulus dimension (for 
example from "rather dependent" to "reasonably dependent") 
produces a constant additive change across all levels of the 
other stimulus dimension. 
2.3 THE AVERAGING MODEL AND THE EUCLIDEAN MODEL 
The major geometrically derived alternative to the city-block 
metric of the averaging model is a model which predicts that the 
proximity measures produced are not the sum of the distances 
along the horizontal and vertical axes, but the hypotenuse of the 
triangle so described. This Euclidean metric would predict that 
any rating produced is the square root of the summed weighted 
squares of the percieved proximity of the given and the 
comparitor stimuli, or, algebraically: 
r ij =\./WA (GA1 - CA ) 2 + 	((1 - WA ) (GD, - CB )) 2 
[Equation 5] 
,where all terms are as defined for earlier equations. 
For the present task, therefore, the Euclidean metric can be 
depicted geometrically as follows: 
Dimension A (xwi) 
rij dWA (GAi - CA) + ((1-WA)(G8j - CB)) 2 
(CA) 
(GAi) 	 (GA1, GBP 
(CA,CB) 
( GAi-CA) 
( GBj-CB ) 
 
   
  
Dimension B (XWB) 
 
(GBP 	(CB) 
   
FIGURE-2.3: GEOMETRIC REPRESENTATION OF THE EUCLIDEAN 
INTEGRATION MODEL. 
This model makes the assumptions of consistent and relative 
weighting as does the averaging model. However, the application 
of a Euclidean metric to this task makes the added assumption 
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that the dimensions in question can be placed at right angles. 
This is not to say that "dependent" and "calm", and "tall" and 
"fair" (which are also stimulus items) are orthogonal, only that 
there is sufficient reason to assume, at least primarily, that 
they are treated independently by the subjects, that is, that 
every subject understands the two terms as having separate 
meanings, and will not actually confuse the meanings to the 
extent that a response is confounded by semantic uncertainty. 
Provided the subjects percieve the adjectives as semantiEally 
different, there is justification in regarding the task as 
operating in two dimensions. Given that the task is thus located 
in two dimensional space, this space can be depicted with 
perpendicular axes. 
The Euclidean and averaging models, while involving 
essentially similar algebra, make quite different predictions 
about performance of subjects in a self-rating task. Both predict 
parallelism to the degree that both predict that the factorial 
plot of data obtained will contain no intersecting lines, 
however, the Euclidean model predicts some "bunching" of lines in 
the plot toward the moreextreme ends, where the Averaging model 
predicts true parallelism. This is due to the nature of 
Pythagorean geometry - as a triangle tends toward equilaterality, 
the hypotenuse becomes relatively shorter for the same summed 
length of the remaining sides. Psychologically, this amounts to 
predicting a "VARIMIN" function within the integration procedure- 
I 	 I 	 I 	 I 	• 	I 
I MIN 811 RE A RAT UNQ EXT 
Figure 2.4 Predicted Factorial Plot of Data under the Averaging Model 
Parameters Fixed as Described in the Text 
6.00e- 1 
5.00e- 1 - 
4.00e- 1 - 
3.00e- 1 - 
2.00e-1 - 
1.00e-1 - 
-1.36e-20 
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subjects will rate as more self-descriptive items in which both 
components are moderately descriptive than those in which one is 
highly and one only slightly descriptive, summed side lengths 
and weights being equal. The averaging function, estimating only 
summed side lengths, makes no such prediction. 
The differences in predicted factorial plot for the averaging 
and Euclidean models can be seen in Table 3, representing the 
predicted responses under the two models with all parameters held 
constant. The weights of the dimensions "dependent" and "calm" 
• are 0.7 and 0.3 respectively, the scale values of the qualifiers 
are as follows: Minimally; 0.1, Slightly; 0.3, Reasonably, 0.4; 
Rather, 0.7; Unqualified, 0.8 and Extremely, 1.0. The comparitor 
position is described as; Dependent, 0.6, Calm, 0.4. With these 
parameters fixed, the factorial plots of the two models are 
depicted in Figures 2.4 and 2.5: 
C 
-0- MEN. 
-0- 31/ 
-0- 1IR . 
-o- 
-1I- UNQ 
-0- EXT. 
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5.00e 1 
4.00e-1 - 
3.00e-1 - 
2.00e-1 - 
1.00e-1 - 
1.36e-20 
MIN. 	SL I. 	REA. 	RAT. 	urto. 	EXT. 
Figure 2.5 Predicted Factorial Plot of Data under the euclidean Model 
Parameters Fixed as Described in the Text. 
If there is any plausibility in the conceptualisation of 
self-rating as task producing estimates of proximities of points 
in N-Dimensional space, it would be expected that either the 
averaging/city block or the Euclidean model should provide a 
reasonable fit to the data produced in this task, and this fit 
should provide a convenient measure of qualifier value, weight, 
and position of the stimuli involved. If, however, neither of 
these two simple geometric models provides an adequate fit to the 
data, then it will become necessary to investigate more complex 
arithmetic models, particularly those in which weight is not 
consistent across the length of the dimension. Among these are 
the extremity weighting model of Anderson (1981), various other 
-differential weight averaging models (e.g Jaccard and Becker, 
1985), and the Congruity model of Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955). 
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2.4 STIMULUS TYPES AND INSTRUCTIONAL SETS 
Prior to discussion of the experimental procedure itself, two 
remaining points of methodology warrant comment. The procedures 
to be described in the present study, if found to produce data 
which successfully fit a simple geometric model, may enable a 
more detailed and convenient device for the understanding of the 
relative roles of weight and position in the processing of 
self-relevant information. However, is necessary to ensure that 
any results obtained can be presumed largely free of any 
systematic procedural artifact. Two types of such artefact are 
investigated in the present study - stimulus biasing and 
instructional biasing, and these shall be discussed briefly in 
the following section. 
1. Stimulus biasing. Adding and Averaging integration ricles have 
been applied to almost all domains of human judgement with 
unusually consistent success. However, it remains true that in 
general the most compelling demonstrations of the sucess of these 
models has been in their application to two domains: the 
estimation of physical attributes of observable, concrete 
stimuli, such as judged heaviness in a size-weight task (1981) or 
area estimations among children (Anderson and Cuneo, 1978), and 
in person likeability judgements (Anderson 1981, 1965). The 
application of the integration rules to more complex, abstract 
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information often requires some rescaling of responses or a 
somewhat more sophisticated averaging model than that for simpler 
judgements. It would seem that judgements of some types of 
stimuli are more patently additive than judgements of others, 
raising the possibility that the extent and existence of 
additivity in Anderson's results may be due to fortuitous 
selection of target stimuli rather than to true generality of the 
Integration rules. In the present task, therefore, subjects are 
asked to rate propositions from two domains- they are asked to 
rate statements in which the adjectives "Dependent" and "Calm" 
are used, randomly intermingled with items in which the 
adjectives "Tall" and "Fair" are used. This simple inclusion of 
an adjective variable will enable analysis of the goodness of fit 
of the various models for both abstract and concrete target 
items. As all stimulus items shall be subjected to the same 
analysis, this manipulation will enable direct comparison of the 
integration rules applying to the rating of abstract and concrete 
self-referential propositions. 
2. Instructional Biasing. The instructional set is well 
documented in cognitive psychology as a test of the robustness of 
cognitive phenomena to trivial change in the task description. 
Such manipulation of instructions is particularly important as 
regards integration theory for two key reasons. Firstly, there is 
Intuitive appeal to the argument that how an experimenter 
describes an integration task may significantly influence the 
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type of integration process ultimately used by the subject. 
Secondly, the nature of the task- forming a single judgement from 
a complex stimulus item -is such that subjects could concievably 
go about it in several quite different ways. This applies 
particularly with regard to the rating of self descriptiveness, 
for which a full range of response tendencies has already been 
observed through various psychological literatures. Later "Barnum 
Statement " research, for instance, has suggested a tendency for 
subjects to endorse as self-descriptive not only the trivial, 
vague and positive descripitions typical of this research area, 
but also specific and often critical bogus personality feedback 
(e.g. Bradley and Bradley, 1977). Conversely, Schema theory 
workers (e.g. Markus, 1977) have reported that subjects who are 
highly schematic on a given domain are highly disposed to reject 
as entirely nondescriptive stimulus items which are only slightly 
disparate to their own position. In spite of the very different 
nature of these and Andersons' tasks, it is clear that both a 
tendency to endorse all statements and one to reject all but the 
exactly accurate would represent departures from predictions 
under additivity. The possibility must therefore be raised that 
the nature of the task and the manner in which it is described 
may substantially influence the rules by which judgements are 
made. 
Gollob and Lugg (1973) investigated the extent to which 
additivity is a byproduct of the experimental task, both in 
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nature and instructions. They exactly replicated Anderson's 
(1965) person perception experiment under various conditions of 
slight changes in stimulus format (embedding the target 
adjectives in a sentence rather than simply presenting two 
adjectives), and small instructional changes (omitting Anderson's 
instruction that equal attention be paid to the adjectivf7s), 
finding that the additive effect found in the original study is 
robust over these changes. 
No attempt, however, has been made to examine the robustness 
of adding-type models to instructional conditions which may be 
seen to actively bias subjects aqinst an adding or averaging 
integration principle. In the present experiment, three different 
sets of instructions are used, with one third of the subjects 
being given each set. The instructions are identical in all but 
the paragraph describing the process of forming a judgement. The 
first set, described as "global", instructs the subjects to read 
the sentence carefully and rate how descriptive they percieve the 
sentence as a whole to be of themselves. The second instructional 
set, the "atomic" set, instructs them to read each part of the 
sentence carefully and make a single rating representing how 
descriptive each part is of them. It it intended that formulating 
the task description in this way will draw subjects' attention to 
the stimulus as a composite. The final set, intended to dispose 
the subject toward rejection of the stimulus, and therefore 
termed the "atomic negative" instructional condition, instructs 
37 
them to read each part carefully and to accept the sentence as a 
whole as true only if they believe both parts to be true. This is 
the only instructional formulation which actually places 
conditions upon a subject's use of a particular point on the 
rating scale. By stating that subjects can endorse a sentence as 
true only_ if both parts are percieved true, it is believt:i.d that 
this instruction will dispose subjects toward the "not at all 
like me" end of the scale, and may thus produce a departure from 
additivity at the upper ratings. That portion of the instruction 
containing the set manipulation is read once by the subject 
during the initial administration of the instructions and 
-repeated by the experimenter once prior to the practice trials 
'and once prior to the experimental trial. In all other respects, 
the instructions administered in the present experiment follow 
the guidelines described by Anderson (1981). The instructions 
used are reported verbatim in the Methods chapter of this thesis 
(Chapter Two). 
This experiment thus contains checks on the robustness of the 
results obtained to minor and theoretically trivial variations in 
both the qualities being rated and the manner in which the rating 
task itself is presented to the subject, with adjective type 
manipulated within subject and instructional set across 
subjects. 
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2.5 SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL INTENT 
The experiment to be described herein investigates the extent 
to which the rating of self-descriptiveness of propositions can 
be seen to conform to certain stated algebraic, geometrically 
derived rules. The rating of the descriptiveness of propositions 
such as those used in this experiment is conceptualised as 
requiring the subject to produce a rating of the proximity 
between her own position on each given dimension and the the 
position indicated by the stimulus item. This proximity 
estimation is initially conceptualised as occurring within 
two-dimensional space, with the each axis representing one 
adjective , or the schema in the domain thncribed by the ° 
adjective, divided into subjective units at the points described 
by the six qualifiers. The magnitude of each axis is determined 
by the weight ascribed to that domain by the subject. Successful 
fitting of the averaging or the Euclidean model would enable 
simultaneous estimation of the relative weights of the adjectives 
in the self-description, the subjective scale values of the 
qualifiers, and the standard point against which all stimuli are 
compared - the actual endorsed position of the subject for each 
domain described by the stimli. This would have implications for 
our understanding of the role of, and the relationship between, 
Importance and extremity in self-schemata. 
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If neither of these simplistic models is found to provide an 
adequate fit to the data obtained, the experimental investigation 
will become one of model fitting, with systematic violation of 
assumptions made in the simpler models until, experimental power 
permitting, a more explanatory model is found. The implications 
of any departure from the initial models shall be discussed in 
the light of the required modifications. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
3.1 SUBJECTS 
Subjects used in the present experiment were 19 adult females 
and 8 adult males ( aged 18 to 45 years) selected through 
personal request by the experimenter. All subjects had English as 
a first language, and all were educated beyond matriculation, 
reducing the possibility of English literacy confounding 
performance in the task. Subjects were assigned in rotation to 
one of the three instructional set groups, the first subject 
recieving the "global" instructions, the second the "atomic 
negative", the third "atomic", and so-on, resulting in nine 
subjects in each of the three groups. The comparatively low 
numbers in each group is attributable to Instructional Set being 
the only variable that is not wholly assessable within subjects, 
and an observation on the basis of early analysis that any main 
effect for this variable was either nonexistent or extremely 
weak, neither of which was viewed as justification for continuing 
data collection. All subjects had normal or corrected vision and 
none reported any difficulty in reading or comprehending the 
stimulus items. 
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3.2 APPARATUS AND MATERIALS 
Stimuli were presented on a General Corporation GC121 black 
and white television monitor controlled by a Unitron 
Microprocessor with Apple Pascal capability, which also recorded 
responses. Responses were registered on a 255 channel touch 
sensitive keyboard labelled at the left hand with the words "Not 
At All Like Me" and at the right hand end with the words "Exactly 
Like Me". Ratings made on this keyboard were converted by the 
experimental programme to values between 0 and 100, with 100 
corresponding to the "exactly like me" rating. Subsequently these 
ratings were further reduced to between 0 and 1. Experimentation 
took place in a quiet, dimly lit laboratory free of distractions. 
Subjects were seated approximately lm. from the screen and the 
stimulus items presented in 40 col. capital letters approximately 
6mm in height. Written, laminated instructions were provided to 
the subjects to maintain consistency of administration. 
3.3 STIMULUS SELECTION 
The selection of the stimulus adjectives for the present 
study was based only upon the criterion that the items used must 
be of reasonably high frequency and each member of a pair be 
commonly recognised as of different meaning. It was also 
required, as discussed previously, that two of the adjectives be 
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descriptive of objective, observable qualities, while the others 
were to be more subjective personal attributes. It was decided 
that the adjectives "Tall" and "Fair" and "Dependent" and "Calm" 
satisfied these minimal criteria. One possible confusion, that 
surrounding the dual meanings of the word "Fair"- the judicial 
and the pigmental- was circumvented with a simple instruction to 
subjects that "Fair" was "in complexion, not in judgement". No 
subjects reported any difficulty with this instruction. 
More rigorous testing was applied to the qualifying adverbs. 
It was necessary firstly to select adverbs which are reasonably 
well distributed along a dimension of "smallest to biggest", and 
also desirable that those ultimately selected should be adverbs 
whose relative position along this dimension is consistent 
across subjects. In a preliminary study, therefore 20 subjects 
were asked to place the adverbs "Extremely", "Very", "Rather", 
"Quite", "Fairly", "Reasonably", "Somewhat", "Moderately", 
"Slightly", "A little" and "Minimally" in rank order from that 
which they thought made the thing described "The biggest or most" 
to that which made the thing described "The smallest or least". 
The mean and standard deviation of rated position was then 
calculated and the five adverbs finally used were selected for 
both eveness of spacing along the magnitude dimension and 
consistency of rating. Full details of the eleven adverbs 
originally rated are provided in Appendix 1. Of the five 
qualifiers finally selected, their mean rated positions from 11 
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to 1 where 11 represents "Biggest or most", and the standard 
deviations associated with these positions were found to be: 
Extremely; 11.00, 0.00; Rather, 8.40, 0.516; Reasonably, 6.200, 
0.789; Slightly, 3.00, 0.816; Minimally, 1.00, 0.000. 
In a pilot study (see Appendix 1) these adverbs were combined 
with the adjectives "Happy", "Unhappy", "Calm" and "Excitable" in 
a person likeableness task (Anderson, 1983), using a 
pencil-and-paper visual analog scale. Three general findings were 
obtained: the rank order of the adverbs was preserved as above, 
parallelism was present in plots of the likeableness data, and 
the visual analog scale proved convenient and comprehe s ible to 
subjects. It was presumed that this pilot study provided 
justification for the use of the visual analog scale (transposed 
in the major study to an electronic touch keyboard), the 
selection of qualifiers, and the rather arbitrary choice of 
adjectives. 
3.4 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE. 
The subject entered the experimental room and were seated in 
front of the black and white monitor, with the touch keyboard at 
the base of the monitor close to the hands of the subject. After 
the instructional set had been selected by the experimenter, the 
appropriate instructions were given to the subject to read. For 
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all subjects, the instruction began as follows: 
This experiment is concerned with how people put 
information together. Your task is to rate how true each 
of a series of sentences is of you, from "not at all like 
me" to "exactly like me". The sentences are all very 
similar, so be sure to read each one carefully before 
making your judgement. 
Before each sentence appears you will hear a tone. 
This is your signal to direct your attention to the 
screen. Shortly after this the sentence will appear on the 
screen, where it will remain until you have made your 
response. 
Here is how to register your response. The keyboard in 
front of you is sensitive to touch. The left-hand end 
represents "not at all like me", the right-hand end 
"exactly like me". Simply touch the keyboard at any point 
between these two that you think corresponds to how true 
the sentence is of you. 
It is important that you respond to each sentence 
separately, without being influenced by your response to 
earlier items. 
For those subjects receiving the "Global" Instructional Set, the 
instructions continued... 
...Judge each sentence on the basis of your impression of 
how true the sentence as a whole is of you. 
For those receiving the "Atomic Negative" instructions, this 
t-entence was replaced with... 
...Read each part of the sentence carefully and judge the 
sentence as true only if you believe that both parts of 
the sentence are true of you. 
,while those receiving the "Atomic" instructions had: 
...Read each part of the sentence carefully and make one 
rating of the sentence on the basis of how true you think 
45 
each part is of you. 
All instructions then concluded with: 
...There will be a series of practice items before the 
experiment begins. 
Have fun, thankyou for being a subject. 
The subjects were given sufficient time to read these 
instructions and asked if they had any questions. Before the 
practice trials were run, the instructions 
were repeated briefly by the experimenter, with the Set 
manipulation included in this description. For example,if a 
subject was assigned the Atomic Instructional Set, she was told: 
"O.K., so all you do is read the sentence when it comes 
along and make a single rating based on how true you think 
each part is of you" 
A ten-item practice trial was then administered, using the 
adjectives "Tanned" and "Fit" and "Happy" and "Solitary", and the 
qualifiers "Very", "Moderately" and "A little", adverbs which had 
been rejected from the set on the basis of the pilot work 
described in section 2.3, yet which almost preserved the 
completeness of the magnitude dimension. Five stimulus items had 
the adjectives "Tanned " and "Fit", and five "Happy" and 
"Solitary". A key departure of this method from that advised by 
Anderson (1983) is the absence of stated end-anchors in the 
present study. This was due in part to the nature of the 
self-rating task- one cannot tell subjects a priori that any 
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particular item is to be the most unlike them, nor that any item 
will be exactly the same as them- and in part to a slighE 
conceptual difference between the city block metric being tested 
herein and an averaging model, as end anchoring commits a subject 
to a given item of maximum proximity to the self, while the 
geometric model allows for there to be no given item which 
exactly corresponds to the comparitor point. Rather than 
allocating a specific end anchor, therefore, in the present task 
subjects were encouraged to use the whole response scale and told 
that each end represented the extremes, and that they would be 
able to tell when they had seen the most extreme sentences. No 
subjects reported difficulties in anchoring their responses 
between the most extreme items they encountered for either the 
practice or the experimental trials. 
Following the practice trials and checks that the subjects 
understood the requirements of the task, that part of the 
instructions containing the instructional set was once again 
repeated as described above and the experimental trail began. 
A warning tone would sound, followed by a delay of 1.5 sec. 
before the stimulus appeared on the subject's screen. The item 
would then remain on the screen until either a response was 
recorded or a ten-second elapsed time expired, where would follow 
a 1 sec. delay prior to the warning tone sounding for the next 
stimulus item. 
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Stimuli were 72 sentences. Each stimulus consisted of either 
the adjectives "Dependent" and "Calm" (in that order) or "Tall 
and Fair" (in that order), with each adjective qualified by any 
one of the adverbs "Minimally", "Slightly", "Rather", 
"Reasonably" and "Extremely" or left unqualified. There were thus 
6 possible qualifier conditions paired with the first adjective X 
6 qualifiers of the second adjective X 2 adjective types = 72 
items to be rated. The computer presented the stimulus items at 
random and recorded the subjects' responses through the couch 
keyboard. The information recorded for each subject was whether a 
response had been made or the elapsed time expired, the positions 
of the left and right hand edges of the subject's finger on the 
keyboard, which was averaged and converted to a rating of between 
0 and 100, a stimulus code, and the reaction time to the 
stimulus. For present purposes the RT values were not subject to 
analysis. The data was collected in a single session, after which 
subjects were debriefed and left the experimental room. 
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS. 
For the purposes of exploratory clarification of the 
additive (row + column) component of the data, the raw data was 
subjected to Median Polish (Tukey, 1977). This procedure enabled 
early examination of the independent row and column effects in 
each subject's 6X6 matrix, and thus a preliminary indication of 
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the degree of additivity. The Median Polish was completed using 
the STATCALC statistical package. 
Following the application of the Median Polish technique, 
data was subjected to preliminary model fitting intended for 
parameter estimation. Each subject's raw data was put through a 
Hookes-Jeeves pattern search programme. This sequential iteration 
programme was run first using the Averaging equation described in 
Equation 4, then the Euclidean Metric. On the basis of these two 
equations the estimation procedure produced an estimate of the 
sum of squared deviations from the model for each subject, a 
table of values expected under the model, and optimized estimates 
of the scale values of the six qualifier conditions, the 
subject's own position on the dimensions, and the relative 
weights of the two dimensions in the ratings. This primary 
analysis thus provided estimates of the goodness of fit of the 
two key models, together with estimates of those parameters upon 
which the models are based. 
Following these two procedures certain modifications were 
made both to the models being fitted and the estimation device 
being used. A constrained optimisation function of the IMSL 
package was utilised to develop estimates of the degree of fit 
between the data and variously constrained versions of the 
Euclidean and Averaging models, and to produce "residuals 
matrices" representing the departure of the data from the model 
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being tested. This phase of the analysis was more specfically 
concerned with attempting to improve upon and account for the 
extent of fit obtained. 
Finally, the data were subjected to Analysis of Variance, of 
the form described by Anderson (1982). This comprises analysing 
not the data per se, but the matrix of differences between the 
observed and the expected values. The rationale for this is given 
on p195, 1982: 
The deviation scores for each subject are correlated 
through their dependence on a common set of parameter 
estimates. However, the deviation scores for different 
subjects are independent, since the model was fitted 
separately for each subject. Accordingly, repeated 
measurements analysis of variance may be applied to 
these deviation matrices. 
(1982, p195) 
The prediciton under this residuals analysis of variance is 
that if the fit to the model is good, there should be no 
significant main effects nor any interactions in the results, 
that is, the prediction is that all variation from the predicted 
values will be random. All analyses of variance were conducted 
with the SPSSX package 
Subsidiary analyses were conducted on the adjective type and 
instructional set variables. Use was also made of the curve 
fitting capacity of the Apple MacIntosh CricketGraph package. 
This general process of analysis was common to all models 
fitted; departures from this process and elaborations upo0 
specific procedures will be pursued further in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
4.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: AVERAGING MODEL. 
Factorial plots of all raw data for all subjects are depicted 
in Appendix III. 
MEDIAN POLISH. As an initial investigation of the independence 
of row (adverb qualifying the first adjective) and column (adverb 
of second adjective) effects, Median Polish (Tukey, 1977) was 
applied to the data of all subjects. This technique, as performed 
by the STATCALC analysis package generates estimates of the 
percentage of variance explained by a simple row + column effect, 
as well as an estimate of the "typical value" , enabling a 
nonstatistical summary of complex data. 
54 Median Polishes were performed, one for each adjective 
type for each subject. Estimates of the percent of variance 
explained by the row + column effect ranged from 8.99 (subject 
number 18, Tall, Fair condition) to 77.70 (subject 16, Dependent 
Calm condition), illustrating the high degree of between subject 
variation and a lack of uniformity in the experimental data. The 
distribution of these estimates across subjects for the Abstract 
and Concrete adjective types are depicted in figures 4.1 and 4.2 
respectively: 
8- Number of Subjects 
6 
4 
10 - Number of Subjects 
8 - 
4 
2 
2 
11111,1111  
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 restate the earlier observation that 
there is a large spread across subjects of the amount of variance 
explained by this extremely simple additive model; slightly 
greater for the "concrete" (tall, fair) than for the "abstract" 
(dependent, calm) adjective type. The mean percentage of 
variance explained for abstract adjective type is 52.80, while 
that +or concrete adjective type is 50.29. The percentage of 
variance explained by the row + column effect for 36 random 
numbers between 0 and 1.00 is 35.79. While this contrast is by no 
means intended as a significance test of any sort, it is , 
indicative of how little systematic effect of the type assessed 
by Median Polish there would seem to be in the experimental data. 
PARAMETER ESTIMATION: AVERAGING MODEL. The application of the 
Hookes-Jeeves Pattern Search function to obtained data yielded 
parameter estimates of disputable value. Appendix II lists the 
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estimates of all parameters for both adjective types under an 
averaging model in which the scale values of "Minimally" and 
"Extremely" are constrained to 0.00 and 1.00 respectively, with 
all other parameters free to vary between these values. This 
r 
constraint was imposed for reasons discussed in the pre ivous 
chapter - to substitute for the use of end anchors and to ensure 
relativity of weighting between the two adjectives. 
For almost half of all data matrices (21 of the 54), the 
Pattern Search function failed in 500 iterations to find reliable 
convergence between the data and the averaging model, so the 
results from this analysis must be treated with caution. 
Of those results obtained, however, certain features warrant 
note. Only eight subjects had comparitor values for "Dependent" 
that were higher than for "Calm"; that is, most subjects rated 
themselves as, in general, less dependent and more calm. Further, 
twenty-one subjects ascribed weights of 0.5 or greater to the 
first dimension in the "abstract" adjective case, that is, most 
subjects weighted "dependence" more highly than "calm" in 
producing their responses. By contrast, the items "Tall" and 
"Fair" seemed to be regarded more equally, both in comparitor 
points and in weighting. A little over half of the subjects rated 
themselves as more tall than fair (15 of the 27 subjects), and 
the same number ascribed weights of 0.5 or greater to the 
component "Tall" in their appraisal. 
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However, estimates of the sum of squared deviance from the 
model from this analysis were high and inconsistent, as can be 
seen by examination of the second column of Appendix II, 
indicating that the proximity of the data to the model is far 
from systematic, and not that which would be expected were the 
data to be consistent with the predictions of a different but 
closely related model, such as the Euclidean Model. The 
distribution of function values derived from this preliminary 
attempt to fit the Averaging model ranged from 0.07 to 4.21, with 
a mean of 1.02. There was a small difference between the mean 
function value for "abstract" adjective type ( 0.985), and that 
for the "concrete" adjective type (1.034), possibly indicating 
that data from the abstract adjective type provided a slightly 
better fit to the averaging model than that from the the concrete 
type. However it would once again be unwise to place any import 
upon this observation. An exact fit to the model would, of 
course, yield a function value of 0.00. 
The substitution of the Euclidean metric for the averaging 
equation in this form of the model made no substantial difference 
to the cons' stency or clarity of the estimates obtained. 
The manifest lack of parallelism in the factorial plots of 
the data, coupled with the inconclusive findings of this 
parameter estimation procedure resulted in a decision to proceed 
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with the development of the model and improvement in the 
estimation procedure rather than to persist with parameter 
estimation for both the averaging and the Euclidean model. 
4.2 SECONDARY MODEL FITTING: AVERAGING AND EUCLIDEAN MODELS 
It was decided on the basis of the failure of the parameter 
estimation procedure that subsequent analysis should concern only 
improving the goodness of fit of the models to the data obtained. 
One observation from the parameter estimates of the preliminary 
run was that for several subjects the estimated scale values of 
the qualifiers were in an order different to that suggested by 
the pilot study (see appendix I). While this is entirely 
consistent with the within-subject nature of the task, and quite 
allowable for the purposes of parameter estimation, certain of 
these reversals seemed unusual from common English usage: such as 
the subject who appeared to have ascribed the qualifer "Slightly" 
a value above that estimated for either "Reasonably" or "Rather". 
It was suspected that at least some of these reversals may have 
been due to either random error or some nonrandom distortion of 
the scale from linearity. In either case to constrain the 6 
qualifier conditions to the order, in ascending magnitude, of 
"minimally", "slightly", "reasonably", "rather", unqualified and 
"extremely" would render the data more accessible to 
interpretation. As can be confirmed from Appendix II, the 
imposition of this constraint would alter the rank order of the 
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qualifier estimates in 25 of the 54 matrices. 
The ZXMWD routines of the IMSL package were utilised for 
these later analyses. The iteration procedure defined for the 
present data continues until 2010 iterations have been reached, 
provided slightly greater analytic power than did the Hookes 
-Jeeves function. It was also felt that the IMSL package, 
contained in a Pascal programme would more efficiently handle the 
repeated changes and modifications required for these later 
optimisation runs. 
Placing this constraint upon the scale values of the 
qualifiers produced substantially lower and more consistent 
function values, though this must in part be due to the impostion 
of the constraint itself. As the present concern is only with 
minimisation of the function values rather than parameter 
estimation, only function values shall be discussed. 
Table 4.1 represents the function values (sums of squared 
deviations from the values expected under the model) obtained 
when this new optimisation function is applied for' both the 
Averaging and the Euclidean models and both types of adjective. 
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TABLE 4.1. FUNCTION VALUES FOR EUCLIDEAN AND AVERAGING 
INTEGRATION MODELS, SCALE VALUES OF @UALIFIERS CONSTRAINED 
FUNCTION VALUE 
AVERAGING MODEL 
SUBJECT ABSTRACT CONCRETE 
EUCLIDEAN 
ABSTRACT 
MODEL 
CONCRETE 
01 0.06 0.41 0.05 0.34 
02 1.20 0.51 1.20 0.51 
03 0.55 0.39 0.55 0.35 
04 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.19 
05 0.41 0.59 0.38 0.54 
06 1.29 0.70 1.02 0.65 
07 0.38 1.19 0.39 0.52 
08 0.77 1.02 0.78 0.81 
09 0.40 0.70 0.36 0.65 
10 0.51 0.38 0.46 0.20 
11 1.37 1.17 1.37 0.85 
12 0.57 0.73 0.54 0.56 
13 0.60 1.11 0.52 1.13 
14 1.00 0.31 0.83 0.35 
15 0.64 0.39 0.44 0.23 
16 0.45 0.95 0.38 1.17 
17 0.94 0.78 0.90 0.65 
18 1.30 0.67 1.21 1.03 
19 1.70 0.66 1.61 0.99 
20 4.26 2.63 3.90 2.37 
21 1.03 0.97 0.80 1.15 
22 1.44 1.87 0.99 1.40 
23 0.65 0.44 0.40 0.46 
24 0.54 0.66 0.55 0.84 
25 1.08 0.37 1.01 0.58 
26 0.86 0.80 0.78 0.78 
27 1.88 0.69 1.61 1.12 
Mean 
Adj type 0.97 0.79 0.86 0.76 
Function 
Value 
Mean 
Model 0.88 0.81 
Function 
Value 
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It would seem from this estimation that for both models the 
concrete adjective condition provides a closer fit than does the 
abstract adjective type, with a mean difference of around 0.15. 
This const1tutes a reversal of the suggestion from the 
preliminary fit, however it is possible that both of these 
differences may be attributable to random error. There is also a 
small mean difference for model type, with the Euclidean metric, 
in general, providing a slightly better fit to the data than does 
the averaging model, though once again no claim shall be made as 
to the substance of this difference at this stage. 
A third and subsequent change in estimation procedure 
involved estimation of the origin of the response scale - 
corresponding to an unweighted Initial Value in Anderson's 1983 
terminology, or the So term in Equation 3. The origin was 
Included for both the additive and the euclidean functions as an 
additive constant. The inclusion of the origin of the scale as a 
parameter to be estimated altered the funtion values derived for 
only four of the 54 matrices - all others had estimated origin 
values. For those matrices that had nonzero origin estimates, 
this value was always less than 0.45. It was felt therefore that 
the inclusion of the origin as a parameter made no substantive 
change to the goodness of fit of the observed value under either 
model. It was thus the expected values under the assumptions of 
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the previous model - constraints upon the qualifier values but 
without estimation of the origin - which were used in the 
Residuals Analysis of Variance (Anderson, 1982). 
4.3 RESIDUALS ANOVA: AVERAGING AND EUCLIDEAN MODELS. 
The "replications method" ANOVA Anderson (1982) involves the 
use of the Analysis of Variance tachnique in order to assess the 
extent of departure of the obtained data from those values 
expected a stated model. By utilizing the deviations of observed 
from expected scores rather than raw data, it becomes possible to 
meaningfully describe trends in data across subjects. While 
parameter estimates can freely differ across subjects, the 
discrepancy between observed and expected data should always be 
random if the data fits the model. Thus the expectation of the 
replications model ANOVA is that all departures from zero are 
random; that is, there should be no significant main effects or 
interactions over all residuals matrices. 
For the present data, residuals matrices were produced for 
both the Averaging and Euclidean models across both adjective 
types and all Instructional Set conditions. This yielded a 6 
(qualifier of the first adjective) X 6 (qualifier of the second 
adjective) X 2 (Adjective type) X 3 (Instructional Set) 
replications ANOVA, in which only Instructional Set exists as a 
59 
between-groups term. The "null hypothesis" thus represents 
nonsignificant departure from the model, under all conditions of 
adjective type and instructional set. 
For the averaging model the replications ANOVA produced 
significant Main Effects for First Qualifier (F = 25.16, 5df, p< 
0.01) and Second Qualifier (F = 24.63, 5df, p< 0.01). There were 
significant two-way interactions between First qualifier and 
Second qualifier (F = 8.75, df25, p< 0.01), Instructional Set and 
Adjective type (F = 5.75, df2, p< 0.05), and Second Qualifier 
and Adjective Type (F = 33.52, df25, p< 0.01). The three way 
interaction of First Qualifier X Second qualifier X Adjective 
type was also significant (F = 1.76, df25, p< 0.05). There was a 
Mirginally significant Main Effect for Adjective type (F = 3.77, 
dfl, p= 0.06).Figures 4.3 and 4,4 overleaf depict the Main 
Effects for First Qualifier and Second Qualifier respectively, 
while the interaction between these factors is represented in 
Figure 4.5. 
As can be seen in Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, the departure of 
the data from the averaging model is not random, but hows a 
distinct quadratic and possible cubic trend- with the observed 
values initially less than expected values for the qualifier 
"minimally", drawing closer to and often overestimating the model 
for the intermediate items, and finally falling well below the 
expected values for the qualifier "extremely". It would also 
appear that there is a more prominant cubic component to the 
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deviation matrix for the second than for the first qualifier, a 
suggestion borne out to some degree by the CricketGraph Curve 
fitting procedure. 
The interaction graph (figure 4.5) indicates that, as well as 
the foregoing, there is a systematic change in the curve for the 
first qualifier as a function of changing the second. Again the 
more extreme items- minimally and extremely- seem to produce 
deviation scores which contain a greater quadratic component than 
do the remaining qualifier conditions. 
The replications ANOVA performed using matrices of deviation 
from the euclidean model produced strikingly similar results. 
Significant main effects were once again found First qualifier (F 
= 10.88, 5df, p< 0.01) and Second Qualifier (F = 9.59, 5df, p< 
0.01). For the Euclidean model, Adjective type also showed a 
significant main effect (F = 5.96, 2df, p< 0.05). The two-way 
interactions of First Qualifier X second Qualifier (F = 4.09, 
25df, p< 0.05), Instructional Set and Adjective type (F = 7.25, 
2df, p< 0.05) and Second Qualifier X Adjective Type (F = 13.01, 
5df, p< 0.01) were once again significant, as was the First 
Qualifier X Second Qualifier X Adjective Type three-way 
Interaction (F = 1.75, 25df, p< 0.05). Figures 4.6 and 4.7 depict 
the main effects for the First and Second qualifiers and, 4.8 
depicts the interaction between them under the expected values of 
the euclidean model. 
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Similar comments apply to these results than to those for the 
averaging model. Both Main Effect curves indicate both quadratic 
and cubic trends in the data, and the interaction graph shows the 
form of changes in the first qualifier curve over changes in the 
second. 
One general difference between the Averaging and Euclidean 
Residuals ANOVA, however, is in the absolute level of the 
deviations observed. While for both models the data significantly 
underestimates then overestimates then underestimates the 
expected values, the numerical magnitude of these Main Effects is 
much less for the euclidean the for the averaging model. There is 
also a difference in the interaction plots, with the Euclidean 
model generally producing more positive residual values, 
suggesting that the ratings produced are more often higher than 
those expected for this model than for the averaging model. This 
difference between models, both the smaller magnitude of 
deviation and the greater positivity of deviations for the 
euclidean model must be atrributable to differences between the 
two models. As discussed in Sect. 2.3, the key difference between 
the Euclidean and the Averaging models is in the VARIMIN function 
of the Euclidean model, which would predict a "clustering" of 
values toward the more extreme scale values. This may suggest 
that there was a degree of such "clustering" in the raw data, a 
finding which would be consistent with a disproportionate 
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weighting of extreme values, as shall be discussed in Chapter 5. 
ADJECTIVE TYPE AND INSTRUCTIONAL SET. The inclusion of 
Instructional Set and Adjective Type as factors in thc , residuals 
ANOVA permits investigation into the degree to which these 
manipulations influence the goodness of fit to the two models(see 
Sect. 2.4). The marginally significant Main effect for Adjective 
Type under the Averaging model, and the significant Main effect 
for the same factor under the euclidean model are depicted in 
figures 4.9 and 4.10 respectively and the interaction between 
Adjective Type and Instructional set for the averaging and 
euclidean models are shown in figures 4.11 and 4.12 respectively. 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 represent the significant interaction 
between Second Qualifier and Adjective Type for , respectively, 
the averaging and euclidean models. 
4.4 THE AVERAGE SUBJECT. 
Anderson (1982) cautions against the use of mean responses 
for the purposes of assessing additive models. However this 
concern is centred more upon validity of parameter estimates than 
of general goodness of fit of the data. The ANOVA results 
suggested effects which are not visible in the raw data plots, so 
it was decided that examination of the mean ratings and deviation 
scores provided the next appropriate step in explanation of the 
data. The use of mean results must, of course be tempered by the 
proviso that the matrices so obtained are not representative of 
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Figure 4.13. Adjective Type by Second Qualifier Interaction. Averaging model 
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the performance of any experimental subject. Figure 4.15 is 
factorial plot, similar to those in Appendix III, of averaged 
responses to each of the 72 items. Responses are also averaged 
over adjective type, producing the 36 point plot depicted. 
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By "ironing out" the individual subject variation, figure 
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discussed in less specific terms. It would suggest that there is 
Indeed a general parallelism in the data obtained, as well as 
evident systematic departures. The curves for qualifiers 
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where all other curves increase in value. 
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together at the extremes; a suggestion also made from the ANOVA 
results. 
By submitting this averaged data to the same iteration 
procedure as described in Sect. 4.2, function values for both the 
averaging and the euclidean models were generated, together with 
matrices of the residuals for these models. The function value of 
the averaged data under the averaging model is 0.187, while that 
for the euclidean model is 0.090, adding some support to out 
earlier indications that the euclidean model provides a slightly 
better fit to the obtained data than does the averaging model. 
Figure 4.16 is a plot of the deviation of each mean rating from 
the value expected for that rating under the averaging model. 
Figure 4.17 is the deviation of the mean ratings from those 
expected under the euclidean model. 
2nd Qualifier 
-0- minimally 
-9- slightly 
-0- reasonably 
-0- rather 
unqua 1 if led 
-0- extremely 
First Qualifier 
minimally slightly reasonably rather unqualified extremely 
Figure 4.16. Residuals Derived From Mean Ratings. Averaging Model 
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2nd Qualifior 
-0- Min brolly 
Slightly 
11" ?seasonably 
-0- 	ther 
Unqua 1 if ied 
-0- I xtrtme ly 
First Qualifier 
Minimally Slightly Reasonably Rather Unqualified Extremely 
_ 	Figure 4.17. Residuals derived From Mean Ratings. Euclidean Model _  
The solid line through the zero point of figures 4.16 and 4.17 
represents the expected values for an exact fit to the model. 
Again the curves shown in figures 4.16 and 4.17 provide a 
degree of support for findings suggested elsewhere. It would seem 
that there is some validity in concluding that the data shows 
generally less deviation from the euclidean than from the 
averaging model, and that the deviation values are more typically 
positive for the former than for the latter. There is also less 
crossing over of curves in the euclidean mean residuals plot than 
it that for the averaging model, suggesting that this model 
predicts more consistently the effect of the second qualifiers 
over levels of the first. The euclidean model would also appear 
to reduce the absolute of spread of the six curves , a 
manifestation of the VARIMIN function described previously. The 
euclidean model therefore provides the better approximation to 
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the data obtained than does the averaging model. 
It must be borne in mind, however, that Figures 4.15, 4.16 
and 4.17 are derived from an essentially hypothetical data set in 
which each response is equal to the mean value of that response 
across all subjects and both adjective types. Examination of 
Appendix III demonstrates strikingly that subjects did not 
consistently obey any compelling integration rule, and the 
departure of the subjects responses from the parallelism or near 
parallelism predicted under the averaging and euclidean metrics 
respectively is as much a feature of the data than whatever 
consistencies may show up in the mean ratings. 
4.5 SUMMARY OF KEY EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS. 
Neither the averaging nor the euclidean model adequately 
predicted the experimental data, as evidenced both by high and 
inconsistent function values from model fitting and by a number 
of significant main effects and interaction terms in the 
replications method ANOVA. 
It is suggested that despite the significant departures from 
both models, the euclidean model provides a better approximation 
to the data than does the averaging model, evidence being derived 
from the estimated goodness of fit, the deviations matrices of 
the residuals ANOVA, and examination of plotted residuals derived 
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from mean ratings. This difference would appear due to the 
prediction by the euclidean model that extreme items shall be 
valued more highly than intermediate items. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 HYPOTHESES OF THE PRESENT STUDY. 
In the light of the failure of the data obtained to 
correspond satisfactorily to either the averaging or the 
euclidean models, certain important features of the Valuation, 
Integration and Response functions as described by Anderson, 
(1981) must be reconsidered and possibly revised. 
It is known from the pattern of significant effects in the 
residuals ANOVA that the data obtained is significantly nonrandom 
(see Sect. 5.4) ,and thus it becomes necessary to examine 
possible sources of the systematic variation of the data from 
both the averaging and the euclidean models. 
For the purposes of the present study, certain expectations 
were held concerning all stages of judgement formation. It was 
hypothesised that Valuation- the ascription of a scale value and 
a weight to a component of a compound stimulus- could be regarded 
as the dual processes of i. estimating the proximity between the 
given item and some fixed comparitor point, and ii. ascribing a 
multiplicative constant to the dimension on which the given 
component lies, that is, weighting the dimension. It was also 
expected that the weight so ascribed would be constant across the 
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length of the stimulus dimension, and that the weighting of the 
two dimensions in the compound would sum to 1.00. 
The present study also tested two possible Integration 
processes that could occur once valuation had taken place; the 
averaging model of Anderson (1965, 1981), in which rated 
judgements are equal to the summed weighted values of the 
components, and an alternative euclidean model in which the 
response is seen as equal to the square root of the summed 
squared weighted scale values of the components. The geometry and 
mathematics of these two models are described in Sects. 2.2 and 
2.3. 
Finally, the Response function was also investigated, albeit 
less centrally. The use of the visual-analog scale in the form of 
an electronic touch keyboard was a methodological development of 
the present study. It was assumed on the basis of pilot work and 
face validity that such a scale would preserve linearity and 
consistency of responses, that is, that the response device would 
not itself interfere with the judgement produced by the valuation 
and integration processes. Each of Valuation, Integration, and 
Response will be discussed in turn before any general conclusions 
are drawn. 
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5.2 THE GEOMETRY OF VALUATION: DIFFERENTIAL WEIGHTING. 
Valuation is the process by which each component of a 
compound stimulus is given a numerical value to be subsequently 
combined by the Integration function. This value comprises two 
Independent parts : a scale value of the component- in the 
present experiment correponding to an estimate of the linear 
proximity of, for example, the item "extremely calm" to a point 
at which the subject would freely place herself, or the 
comparitor point, on a conceptual dimension reaching from "zero 
calm" to "infinity calm": and a weight - corresponding to the 
relative importance of "Calm" in a rating when combined with 
"Dependent". Under the two-component conditions of the present 
experiment, the space in which valuation and integration occurs 
was expected to be two-dimensional. This description of the 
valuation process was common to both the averaging and the 
euclidean models. Critical to this description of the valuation 
process is the constancy of weighting along the length of the 
dimension. Nonconstant weighting is inconsistent with the 
two-dimensional analogy made herein, as it effectively results in 
each compound stimulus item occupying a different set of axes. 
One cannot predict, under differential weighting, the proximity 
of two points in space from the proximity of each of those points 
to a number of other points, as there may be a substantial change 
In relative weighting intervening. 
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Problems in producing generalisable functions for 
differential weight models have been discussed in the literature 
for some time. Oden and Anderson (1971) attempted to test a 
differential weight averaging model in judgements of seriousness 
of criminals, favourableness of meals, and effectiveness, 
respect, and liking for naval officers by assuring preservation 
of constant weighting in one dimension, thus enabling comparison 
of this weight to the weighting of the other items at various 
stimulus levels. They found, however, that while the general 
pattern of judgements supported an averaging model, the 
differential weighting was less clear, and only detectable in the 
form of departures from parallelism. In comparing differential 
weight and constant weight models, they write: 
Differential weighting unfortunately produces 
nonlinearities in the response-stimulus relation because 
the weights enter the denominator of the averaging 
equations. (see Equation 3]. However, simple analyses are 
available if equal weighting can be maintained within one 
factor of the design... 
(p.I60) 
In the present experiment, of course, no methodological 
attempt was made to preserve constancy of weighting along either 
dimension - such constancy was assumed for the purposes of model 
analysis. It cannot be ascertained, therefore, whether either, 
both, or neither dimension in each compound preserved constancy 
of weighting for all levels of the stimulus dimension. 
It is fruitful, nonetheless, to briefly examine, in the light 
79 
of the present results, models of judgement which predict 
differential weighting of particular items in opinion formation, 
particularly those models which predict some change in the 
valuation of items as a result of item extremity. 
Anderson (1981) says of the effects of negativity and 
extremity in judgement that: 
A negativity effect means that negative information has 
greater importance than positive information or,, more 
generally, that importance is an inverse function of scale 
value. An extremity effect means that importance is a 
direct function of scale value. Within averaging theory, 
negativity and extremity effects reflect weight parameters 
that are not constant, but instead are correlated with 
scale value. These effects are thus special cases of 
differential weighting 
(p.275). 
Several judgement theorists have investigated the extent to 
which the extremity of a rated item influences the weighting of 
that item in the compound. The Congruity model of Osgood and 
Tannenbaum (1955), for instance, predicts that the weights of the 
components of a compound stimulus are distributed in proportion 
to their scale values - that is, that weight is differentially 
distributed by importance. A prediction drawn from this by Warr 
and Jackson (1975) is that, set against a constant standard 
point, increasing the value of the more important component in 
the compound will increase the weight of that component. Using 
ratings of contingency - how likely it is that a person would be 
A as given that she is B- disconfirmed the above predictions of 
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the congruity model, supporting instead an alternative Range 
Adjustment model, in which a standard starting point, 
representing the more important component is adjusted back by a 
constant representing the less important component. They suggest 
from this that increasing the extremity of a component has 
minimal effect upon the weight of that component until such a 
time as a qualitative cognitive change in the nature of the 
nature of the judgement occurs. Warr and Jackson (1975) conclude 
that: 
...extremity is of general importance in compound 
judgement but that increasing extremity does not yield 
greater importance until the judgement becomes one of 
certainty. 
The findings of Warr and Jackson, however, represent an 
atypical result for extremity studies, in which it is usual to 
find differential weighting of extreme items, and maycbe subsumed 
by a more general extremity weighting model, the only key feature 
of the Warr and Jackson (1975) findings being the swift change in 
weighting observed at high levels of extremity. 
Manis, Gleason and Dawes (1966) produced extremity weighting 
effects across a range of social judgements. Anderson and 
Alexander (1971 reinterpreted by Anderson, 1981) identified 
deaprtures from parallelism consistent with extremity weighting 
in person perception judgements. Anderson (1981) discusses at 
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some length the problems extremity and negativity rating pose for 
an adding or averaing integration model. 
There is some evidence that the departures from the euclidean 
and averaging models in the present experiment may have been due 
in part to an extremity weighting valuation function, with the 
qualifiers "minimally" and "extremely", particularly "extremely", 
creating extreme points on the rated dimensions which are then 
weighted more highly by the Valuation function than less extreme 
points. This would result in the distances between items at these 
extreme points being greater than at interme:Aiate points along 
the dimensions. Proximity estimates would thus be generally lower 
at the extreme qualifer levels than at all others. This is a 
feature visible both in the individual subject plots of Appendix 
III and in the averages plot of Figure 4.17. 
A second suggestion derivable from extremity weighting 
concerns the nature of the departure of the data from the values 
expected under a constant-weight averaging model. As stated 
earlier, the extremity weighting model would predict that the 
rated similarity to self would in general be lower for extreme 
than for non-extreme components. These ratings would also be 
lower than those expected under the constant weight averaging 
model, that is, extremity weighting model would predict in the 
context of the present experiment that the ratings observed will 
typically be lower than those expected under the averaging model 
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at the "Minimally" and "Extremely" ends of the scale for each of 
the first and second qualifiers. This prediction also finds some 
support in the curves for the main effects within the residuals 
for the first and second qualifiers for both the averaging and 
euclidean models ( Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.6 and 4.7) . 
Finally, a form of support for a valuation function in which 
weight and scale value are correlated can be seen in the 
ancilliary finding that, although depatures from both were 
significant in the present study, the magnitude of the difference 
between the observed and the expected values was generally a 
little lower for the euclidean than for the averaging model. As 
discussed elsewhere (sect.2.6, 4.4) the central difference 
between the averaging and the euclidean models is the prediction 
from the latter that, as the scale values become more equal, the 
proximity estimates between points shall increase. This is 
tantamount to a prediction that ratings for extreme values shall 
be typically somewhat lowere than for intermediate values, as 
well as more clustered. That the euclidean model seemed, in 
general, to align somewhat more closely with the data than did 
the averaging model may be due to the manner in which the former 
mimics the predictions of a differential weight averaging model 
in which weight increases with extremity. This is further 
evidenced by the observation that the shape of the departure of 
the data from the euclidean model is essentially the same as that 
for the averaging model. That is, the euclidean model also 
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overestimated the proximity ratings at the extreme ends of the 
scale, allowing the possibility that the failure of this model 
was due to its relative "underestimation" of the extrr..8,mity 
effects, while its general superiority to the averaging model is 
due to its mimicry of them. 
It must be remembered however, that there was significant 
departure of the data from the euclidean model, and the evidence 
for extremity weighting in valuation is no stronger than that for 
a euclidean integration function. It is impossible, therefore, to 
conclude whether the results obtained support a constant weight 
valuation coupled with an unknown integration rule, or an 
extremity weighting valuation function operating within an 
averaging-like integration procedure. 
5.3 THE GEOMETRY OF INTEGRATION; AVERAGING AND EUCLIDEAN MODELS. 
The results of the present study provide no compelling 
support for either the constant weight averaging model nor the 
euclidean model of information integration. Factorial plots of 
the subjects' data (Appendix III) reveal gross lack of 
parallelism, and the mean ratings plot (figure 4.15) shows that, 
even with the within-subject variation averaged, there is still 
serious departure from parallelism. This departure goes over and 
above the pattern of results cited above as possible evidence for 
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an extremity weighting valuation function. The crossing over, for 
example, of the curves for qualifiers "minimally" and "slightly" 
in the plot depicted in figure 4.15, is a finding which has no 
explanation within a constant weight averaging or euclidean 
integration model. The only clear conclusion that can be drawn 
regarding the integration function utilised for self-rating in 
the present study is that it would appear to be neither averaging 
nor euclidian but that there is, however, is evidence that 
whatever the function is, it is more simlilar to a euclidean than 
to an averaging model. 
One of the central purposes of the study- to investigate the 
extent to which schemata and self-rating can be viewed as the 
generation of proximity estimates in N-dimensional space would 
seem thus unresolved. Certainly the simplistic geometric 
alternatives ,presented in Chapter 2 have not been supported by 
the results of the present experiment. A question which must 
therefore be asked is could self-rating be a geometric task of 
the type described in chapter 2 without obeying either a 
city-block nor a euclidean metric? The answer, certainly is yes. 
Even if the process of valuation is precisely as described in 
Sect. 2.2 - calculation of the proximity of the stimulus to a 
comparitor point in 2-dimensional space, there are a potentially 
infinite number of ways in which the distance between the two 
points defined could be calculated. However, the city block, 
adding-type metric and the euclidean metric certainly represent 
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the most obvious of the alternatives, and the failure of these 
two models would seem to hold little hope for any more complex or 
sophisticated models, and therefore for a general N-dimensional 
geometric interpretation of self-rating. 
Shepard (1962) discusses the general use of multidimensional 
scaling in the analysis of proximities in spaces of unknown 
dimensionality, however the design of the present experiment 
lacks the power for these multidimensional analyses. 
The results of the present study thus provide falsification 
of the geometric rendition of self rating as stated in chapter 2, 
as well as indicating a failure of the equal weight averaging 
model (Anderson, 1981) to adequately predict performances on a 
self-rating task. No affirmative evidence can be gained, however 
as to which integration function is used for this type of 
rating, although, as discussed previously, a case can be made for 
the operation of an averaging integration function if coupled 
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with an extremity weighting valuation function, however even this 
explanation cannot account fully for the crossing over of curves 
in factorial plots of the raw data. 
5.4 THE RESPONSE FUNCTION. 
A final implication for the integration function lies in the 
examination of the response function for the present experiment. 
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If a case can be made that the response scale used by the 
subjects, or some stage of the conversion from response formation 
to the rating produced somehow corrupted the response the subject 
has formed, it may be said that the data of the present 
experiment does not reflect failure of the integration 
procedures, but rather some failure of the rating mechanism to 
capture the averaging or euclidean nature of the judgements 
formed. 
There are two sources from which such nonlinearity of rating 
with response could occur. There may have been nonlinearity of 
responses due to nonlinearity of the scale as used by the 
subjects, that is, subjects may not have utilised direct 1:1 
mapping of judged self-descriptiveness to the visual-analog 
response medium. This would result in apparr-ent nonparallelism in 
both the data plots and the replications method ANOVA. 
Birnbaum (1974) found that such apparent departure from the 
'Adding or averaging models could be removed through monotonic 
rescaling of the response scale. Anderson (1982) presents 
diagrams of four types of factorial plot in which response scale 
nonlinearity is to be considered. One such diagram (A X B model, 
page 227, Anderson, 1982) bears similarities to the data of the 
present experiment - a clustering of responses at either end of 
the scale spreading out through the central judgements. However, 
as described earlier (Sect 5.2) it is precisely this rfeature that 
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may be indicative of an extremity weighting Valuation function, a 
problem noted by Oden and Anderson (1971). Anderson (1982) also 
notes that two-factor models typically lack the power for 
monotone anylsis and that a decision must made as to whether such 
such analysis clarifies or merely renders the raw data falsly 
parallel. 
Finally concerning the possibility of nonlinearity of the 
response scale, it must be noted that parallelism, or at least 
failure of the factorial curves to cross over across levels of 
the one factor, is an essential feature of that datikfor which 
monotone analysis is appropriate. 
For certain models, suitable choice of stimulus levels 
will yield crossovers that may be used to rule out 
monotone transformation to additivity. The averaging 
model.. .will yield crossovers if the column stimuli are 
extended to larger values...But although crossovers may 
disprove an adding model, they do not prove any other 
model. 
(Anderson, 1982, p.229) 
The pattern of results of the present experiment, due to 
crossing over of curves in the factorial plots of the data, 
therefore contraindicate monotone analysis, as well as providing 
evidence against an adding model of integration. The crossovers 
of the present data provide no evidence for consistent 
nonlinearity of the response scale. 
A second possiblity concerning the response function is that 
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the obtained data simply reflect a high degree of arbitrariness 
to the subjects' responses; that is, some intrinsic weakness of 
instructions or design such that subjects either did not form 
judgements at all, or those . judgements were not represented in 
the ratings elicited. 
While there is cee%inly evidence of a high level of noise in 
the within-subjects data variation, the statistical evidence 
indicates against the suggestion that error is the greater part 
of the responses produced. An important feature of the residuals 
ANOVA design is that the null hypothesis is that all variation 
from the data is random. Thus there are two circumstancesunder 
which nonsignificant results will be obtained. If the data is an 
exact fit to the model plus or minus error, the residuals ANOVA 
will yield total nonsignificance. This will also be true, 
however, if the data is totally or predominantly random. Thus the 
large number of significant effects in the residuals analysis of 
variance is itself evidence that the pattern of subjects' 
responses is significantly nonrandom. Given this, it must be 
supposed that subjects were generally performing consistently 
with some form of integration rule, however, the present results 
give no clear indication as to what that rule may be. The 
evidence from the present study is thus also inconsistent with 
any suggestion of gross methodological failure. 
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5.5 INTEGRATION THEORY AND SELF-RATING: IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHEMA 
THEORY 
The findings of the present experiment falsify several 
hypotheses concerning integration theory and self-rating. 
Evidence is provided against a constant-weight averaging model of 
integration, and a euclidean model of the same function, and thus 
also against the geometric representations of these models 
discussed in Chapter 2. While there is some indication of an 
averaging-type integration mode with extremity weighting (Sect 
5.2), that evidence is only secondary and in part contraindicated 
by the extent to which curves in the factorial plots of that data 
obtained cross over, a finding not entirely inconsistent but nor 
supportive of this model. Nonlinearity of the response scale, 
rectifiable by monotonic rescaling, while a possibility, is 
firstly beyond the power of the two-factor design utilised 
herein, and secondly could not remove the crossover observed in 
the factorial data. 
Accordingly, the present experiment reveals little concerning 
the merit of regarding schemata as analogous with points in 
N-Dimensional space. Certainly the two-dimensional analogy used 
in the present experiment appears not to capture the principles 
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by which schematic self-rating is carried out. 
Simultaneous estimation of position and weight- the major 
potential contribution of Integration Theory (Anderson, 1981, 
1983) to the understanding of self schemata is , however, no less 
valuable for the failure of the present experiment. The results 
obtained herein suggest not that the estimation of position and 
weight as separate and independent aspects of a single schema is 
invalid or impossible, but rather that a more complex and 
adequate model of information integration is required before such 
essential estimation can take place. 
(') 
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APPENDIX I. PILOT WORK FOR THE PRESENT STUDY 
There were two piloting processes prior to the major 
experimentation , the first concerning the properties and 
ordering of the qualifiers, the second more directly assessing 
the use of visual-analog scale as a response medium. 
1 QUALIFIER SELECTION. A pool of eleven qualifiers was originally 
chosen for item analysis. These were: "Extremely", "Very", 
"Rather", "Quite", "Fairly", "Reasonably", "Somewhat", 
"Moderately", "Slightly", "A Little" and "Minimally". Twenty 
subjects were asked to rank order these items from that which 
made a thing described the "Biggest or most" to that which made a 
thing the "Smallest or least". The means and standard deviations 
of ranked positions were than calculated, the results being as 
follows: 
Qualifier Mean Ranking S.D. 
Extremely 11.00 0.000 
Very 10.00 0.000 
Rather 8.40 0.516 
Quite 7.00 2.108 
Fairly 6.00 1.333 
Reasonably 6.20 0.789 - 
Somewhat 5.20 1.317 
Moderately 6.00 2.211 
Slightly 3.00 0.816 
A Little 2.20 0.422 
Minimally 1.00 0.000 
The criteria for inclusion into the experimental items were i. 
Qualifiers that were spread across the full length of the 
magnitude dimension, and ii. preference was given for items with 
low standard deviations. "Extremely" and "Minimally" were thus 
Immediately included. "Very" was rejected on the distribution 
criterion, in spite of its low S.D. "Rather" and "Reasonably" 
were included as the midrange qualifiers due to their being more 
consistently ranked than "Quite", "Fairly", "Somewhat" or 
"Moderately" - the alternative midrange items. "Slightly" was 
chosen in preference to "A Little" on the distribution criterion-
it represented a point midway between "Reasonably" and 
"Minimally". The unqualified condition was not investigated in 
this analysis. 
The Qualifers "Very", "Moderately" and "A Little" were used 
in the practice trials. 
2. RESPONSE MEDIUM. 
The utility of the visual analog scale was investigated in a 
separate pilot study using a diiferent sample from that described 
above. It was felt that such a device, being without any 
92 
numerical scale, would remove interval scaling on the part of the 
subjects, as well as emphasising the continuity of possibile 
judgements. 
A person likeability task (Anderson, 1965, 1981) was utlised 
in which subjects were asked to mark on a line a cross 
representing how much they believed they would like the person 
described. The left-hand end of the line was marked "very 
little", the right-hand end "a lot". The qualifiers "Minimally", 
"Slightly", "Reasonably", "Rather", and "Extremely" were used, as 
well as an unqualified condition. These were combined with the 
adjectives "Calm" and "Excitable" and ""Happy" and "Unhappy", 
with one of the former always as the first and one ofothe latter 
always as the second adjective. The items were generated thus 
were arranged randomly in a booklet that was then administered to 
20 subjects, together with the instructions. 
Parallelism was observed in the factorial plots for all 
subjects, although there was a high level of error. These results 
are consistent with those of Anderson (1965, 1981), and were 
taken as evidence that the use of the visual-analog scale 
preserved parallelism in judgement, as well as demonstrating that 
the use of qualifiers served to locate items along the dimension 
qualified in the manner described in Chapter Two. 
Plots of the rated likeability of each adjective coupled with 
each qualifier condition demonstrated the "linear fan" pattern 
representative of multiplicative combination of items (Anderson, 
1981), illustating that the adjectives did indeed act as 
multiplicative constants for the adjectives - the qualifed 
adjective thus defining a point somwhere between a zero and an 
infinite value for that qualifier. 
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APPENDIX II. PRELIMINARY MODEL FITTING FOR PARAMETER ESTIMATION. 
AVERAGING MODEL. 
1. ABSTRACT (DEPENDENT/CALM) ADJECTIVE TYPE. 
Estimated Parameter Values 
1 
SU# 0-E2 . MIN. SLI. REA. RAT. UNO. EXT. CA CD WA 
01 0.07  0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.54 0.41 
02 1.07 0.00 0.00 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.60 0.44 
03 0.48  0.00 0.01  0.18 1.00 1.00  1.00 0.58 0.00 0.89 
04 0.48  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.50 0.59 
05 1.64  0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.39 0.46 
060.92 0.00 0.27 0.50 0.87 0.99 1.00 0.78 0.01 0.71 
07 0.48 0.00 0.44 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.77 0.87 0.91 
08 0.98  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.5 0.51 
09 0.55  0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 0.40 0.46 0.49 
10 0.72 0.00 0.31 0.45 0.98 0.93 1.00 0.69 0.67 0.86 
11 0.60 0.00 0.01 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.48 0.05 0.58 
12 1.34  0.00 0.23 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.92 0.93 
13 0.70  0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.39 0.44 
14 0.63 0.00 0.21 0.54 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.76 0.72 0.56 
15 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.68 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.79 0.00 0.70 
16 0.60 0.00 0.35 0.48 0.95 0.89 1.00 0.79 0.35 0.79 
17 0.52 0.00 0.60 0.80 0.76 0.79 1.00 0.57 0.87 0.14 
18 	1.13  0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.31 0.51 
q4 
su# 0-Ee . MIN. SLI. 
19 1.13 0.00 0.12 
20 2.08 	0.00 0.00 
REA. 
0.67 
0.00 
RAT. LINO. EXT. 
 
0.97 0.81 1.00 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
CA 
0.87 
0.49 
Cm 	WA 
0.19 0.78 
0.38 0.69 
21 4.21 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.59 0.19 0.59 
22 0.95 0.00 0.26 0.58 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.79 0.34 0.68 
23 1.07 0.00 0.27 0.71 0.94 0.64 1.00 0.77 0.35 0.55 
24 0.65 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.74 0.84 1.00 0.40 0.60 0.43 
25 1.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.92 0.86 1.00 0.36 0.42 0.46 
26 0.72 0.00 0.28 0.46 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.48 0.20 0.57 
27 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.25  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.00 0.85 
S# = Subject Number, O-E2 = Function Value (summed squared 
Observed-Expected Difference), MIN. = Minimally, SLI. = Slightly, 
REA. = Reasonably, RAT. = Rather, UN. = Unqualified, EXT. = 
Extremely, CA = Comparitor point upon dimension A, CD = 
Comparitor point upon Dimension B, WA = Weight of Dimension A. 
Weight of dimension B (W e ) = 1 - WA. Underscored values are those 
for which the iteration procedure reported no convergence with 
the model in 500 iterations 
016 
2. CONCRETE (TALL/FAIR) ADJECTIVE TYPE. 
Estimated Parameter Values 	1 
SU# 0-E2. MIN. SLI. REA. RAT. UNO. EXT. CA 	CB 	WA 
01 0.43 0.00 0.10 0.16 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.55 1.00 0.93 
02 0.62  0.00 0.88  0.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.91 
03 0.39 0.00 0.00 	 0.23 0.90 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.45 1.00 
04 0.38 0.00 0.15 0.27 0.85 0.80 1.00 0.57 0.52 0.70 
05  1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.39 0.46 
06  1.43 0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.56 0.51 
07  1.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 0.45 0.49 0.23 
08 1.30 0.00 0.16 0.36 0.94 0.86 1.00 0.57 0.18 0.79 
09 0.87 0.00 0.02 0.17 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.42 1.00 
10 0.46 0.00 0.47 0.43 0.80 0.57 1.00 0.68 0.61 0.47 
11 0.51 0.00 0.52 0.58 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.65 0.43 
12  1.17 0.00 0.30 0.36 0.90 0.44  1.00 0.69 0.43 0.67 
13 0.77 0.00 0.36 0.49 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.69 0.68 0.55 
14 1.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.34 0.54 0.41 
15  0.16 0.00 0.21  0.34 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 0.79 
16 0.41 0.00 0.44 0.57 0.93 0.69 1.00 0.78 0.47 0.80 
17 1.68 0.00 0.33 0.59 0.80 0.62 1.00 0.62 0.63 0.40 
18 0.81 0.00 0.25 0.51 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.58 0.72 0.22 
19 1.05 0.00 0.53 0.76 0.95 0.73 1.00 0.80 0.78 0.60 
20 1.18 0.00 0.02 0.58 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.75 0.67 0.51 
96 
SU* 0-E2. MIN. SLI. REA. RAT. UM/. EXT. CA CD 	WA 
21 2.78 0.00 0.61 0.44 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.61 0..767 0.40 
121.78 0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.35 0.54 0.51 
23 7.02 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.81 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.32 0.18 
14 a.79 0.00 0.35 0.61 0.60 0.73 1.00 0.67 0.69 0.58 
2g -1-71a4 	0.00 0.51 0.74 0.72 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.74 0.51 
26 1.01 0.00 0.50 0.73 0.76 0.82 1.00 0.82 0.77 0.60 
27 0.79 0.00 0.41 0.76 0.77 0.78 1.00 0.77 0.70 0.50 
S# = Subject Number, 0-E2 = Function Value (summed squared 
Observed-Expected Difference), MIN. = Minimally, SLI. = Slightly, 
REA. = Reasonably, RAT. = Rather, UNO. = Unqualified, EXT. = 
Extremely, CA = Comparitor point upon dimension A, CD = 
Comparitor point upon Dimension B, WA = Weight of Dimension A. 
Weight of dimension B (W m ) = 1 - W. Underscored values are thos 
for which the iteration procedure reported no convergence with 
the model in 500 iterations. 
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